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First Amendment Standards for
Government Subsidies of Artistic
and Cultural Expression: A Reply to
Justices Scalia and Rehnquist
Lionel S. Sobel*
I.
Seventy years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes authored what
has become one of the best known phrases in first amendment jurispru-
dence. "The most stringent protection of free speech," he asserted,
"would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and caus-
ing a panic. ' By this phrase, Justice Holmes demonstrated, to the sat-
isfaction of most, that the first amendment is not as absolute as the
plain meaning of its words suggests. He did so by reasoning backwards
from an assumed conclusion-that falsely shouting fire in a crowded
theatre may be punished-to the necessary meaning of the constitu-
tional provision that permits such a result.
In most cases, this form of reasoning would be suspect or worse.
But Justice Holmes employed it without criticism, because the conclu-
sion he assumed was what Professor William Van Alstyne has so aptly
described as an "irresistible counterexample."2 Irresistible counterex-
amples are assumed conclusions that appear to be so self-evident, so
beyond dispute, that they do not follow from the law. Instead, for those
who accept them, irresistible counterexamples dictate what the law it-
self must be.
The use of irresistible counterexamples has itself proved irresistible
to scholars and judges alike.3 If the examples are truly compelling, they
are persuasive tools of argumentation, and their use rarely does harm.
Recently, however, Justice Antonin Scalia abused an "irresistible
* Associate Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; author, annual supplements to NIM-
MER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH; editor, Entertainment Law Reporter.
1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
2. Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALiF. L. REv. 107, 113
(1982).
3. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 54 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.01, at 2-5 (1984).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
counterexample," and in so doing, created an opinion that, in the wrong
hands, could be used to harm government support for artistic and cul-
tural expression.
The case in question is Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland,4 which on its face has little if anything to do with government
support for art or culture. What it did concern was the constitutionality
of an Arkansas statute that imposed a sales tax on general interest
magazines (as well as other merchandise), but exempted religious, pro-
fessional, trade, and sports journals. The Supreme Court held that the
statute violated the first amendment because the statute treated some
publications less favorably than others, and-worse yet-distinguished
among publications on the basis of their content. While these facts did
not compel the conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional, they
did give rise to a presumption of unconstitutionality. In order to over-
come the presumption, Arkansas had to show that the distinctions
made by its statute served a compelling interest and that the statute
was narrowly tailored to achieve that particular interest. This, Arkansas
failed to do,5 and thus it lost the case.
The Court's opinion, authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, is
short and direct, and is a logical application of the principles an-
nounced just five years ago in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Min-
nesota Commissioner of Revenue,' in which the Court declared
unconstitutional a state tax on all newspaper expenditures for paper
and ink in excess of 100,000 dollars. Justice Marshall's opinion breaks
no new ground and fits comfortably into the existing fabric of first
amendment doctrine. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia dissented.
In a surprisingly shrill opinionJ Justice Scalia argued that tax ex-
emptions are "a form of subsidy," and that a government decision to
subsidize some but not all speech "is not subject to strict scrutiny." 8
The Court's majority had ruled otherwise, and Justice Scalia criticized
that result using what he apparently considered to be an "irresistible
counterexample." Justice Scalia wrote:
By [strictly scrutinizing the Arkansas sales tax statute], the majority casts
doubt upon a wide variety of tax preferences and subsidies that draw distinctions
based upon subject-matter... . The Kennedy Center, which is subsidized by the
Federal Government in the amount of up to $23 million per year. . . is authorized
by statute to "present classical and contemporary music, opera, drama, dance, and
poetry." . . . Is this subsidy subject to strict scrutiny because other kinds of ex-
pressive activity, such as learned lectures and political speeches, are excluded? Are
4. 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 70-72.
6. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
7. See, e.g., 107 S. Ct. at 1730-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 1731.
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...the funding activities of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. . .subject
to strict scrutiny because they provide money for ... some subjects but not
others?
Because there is no principled basis to distinguish the subsidization of speech
in these areas-which we would surely uphold-from the subsidization that we
strike down here, our decision today places the granting or denial of protection
within our own idiosyncratic discretion. In my view, that threatens First Amend-
ment rights infinitely more than the tax exemption at issue.9
The majority opinion does not reply to this dissent or address its
points in any fashion. This failure was noted immediately by Professor
Stephen Barnett who concluded, quite correctly, that Justice "Scalia's
critique deserved better than the silence it received from the Court." 10
If Justice Scalia were correct about the implications of Arkansas Writ-
ers' Project, his assertions deserve greater attention because a judge in
some other case may conclude that Kennedy Center subsidies and Cor-
poration for Public Broadcasting (CPB) grants, or other similar forms
of government support for the arts, are in fact unconstitutional-even
though Justice Scalia neither intended nor desired such a result.
Justice Scalia was joined in dissent by Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist. This is not surprising, because several years earlier, Justice Rehn-
quist authored a remarkably similar dissent in Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad." The issue in that case was whether the
City of Chattanooga had violated the first amendment rights of the pro-
ducers of the rock musical Hair when the city rejected their application
to stage the show in a city-operated theater. The city did so on the
grounds that Hair included nudity and obscenity and thus would not be
in the community's "best interest."
Best interest or not, Hair's producers eventually won. The Su-
preme Court held that the city's refusal to rent the theater to the pro-
ducers had been a prior restraint, and that the city's handling of their
application had lacked the procedural safeguards required by the first
amendment. In his dissent, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist contended
that "the apparent effect of the Court's decision is to tell the managers
of municipal auditoriums that they may exercise no selective role what-
soever in deciding what performances may be booked." 2 And then, us-
ing irresistible counterexamples of his own, Justice Rehnquist asked,
rhetorically, "May an opera house limit its productions to operas, or
must it also show rock musicals? May a municipal theater devote an
entire season to Shakespeare, or is it required to book any potential
9. Id. at 1732.
10. Barnett, Free Speech in the New Court, 73 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1987, at 48, 49.
11. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
12. Id. at 571-72.
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producer on a first come, first served basis?"'" As Professor Kenneth
Karst observed in his comment on Southeastern Promotions, the
Court's majority "answered these questions with silence."1
The failure of the Court to respond to Justices Scalia and Rehn-
quist is puzzling, because in both cases their questions are easily an-
swered. Yes, government subsidization of the Kennedy Center is subject
to strict scrutiny because the Center is authorized to present certain
kinds of expressive activities but not others. Yes, the funding activities
of the CPB are likewise subject to strict scrutiny because the CPB pro-
vides money for the production of programs on some subjects but not
others. Yes, an opera house may be able to limit its productions to op-
eras; it may not have to show rock musicals. Yes, a municipal theater
may devote an entire season to Shakespeare; and if it does so, it need
not book producers on a first come, first served basis.
None of these answers, however, would have required a different
result in Arkansas Writers' Project or in Southeastern Promotions.
Thus, although the examples employed by Justices Scalia and Rehn-
quist may have been "irresistible," these examples were not "counterex-
amples," because the conclusions they assumed were perfectly
consistent with the results reached by the Court's majority in both
cases. An appreciation of this consistency is important not only in con-
nection with those two cases in particular, but also in connection with
the larger question of government support for the arts in general.
The purpose of this Essay is to promote such an appreciation, and
its thesis is this. First, the first amendment does impose standards by
which courts may evaluate the constitutionality of government subsi-
dies of cultural and artistic expression. Second, those standards do per-
mit the government to be selective about the recipients of its largess,
provided the government uses appropriate criteria in making its selec-
tions. Third, some criteria, though appropriate, must nevertheless un-
dergo strict scrutiny. And, fourth, in many cases such criteria will
withstand strict scrutiny, although the criteria in Arkansas Writers'
Project and Southeastern Promotions did not.
II.
At first blush, some may wonder how the first amendment has any-
thing at all to say about government support for artistic and cultural
expression. The first amendment, after all, prohibits the government
from "abridging" free expression, not encouraging it. And in fact, first
13. Id. at 572-73.
14. Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public Forum: A Comment on Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 248 (1976).
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amendment issues would not arise if government support were equally
available to all who asked for it. In reality, however, support for the arts
is rarely if ever available to all. Instead, resources are limited, and the
government almost always has to choose between those who get support
and those who do not. When the government provides support to some
people, but not others, those who did not get it may contend that the
government has abridged their free expression rights by denying the
support they requested.
The government provides support for the arts in many different
ways, and this Essay uses the words "support" and "subsidy" in the
broadest sense. "Support" and "subsidy" are meant to include: first,
financial grants of the sort made by the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting and the National Endowment for the Arts; second, spending by
the government in connection with its ownership and operation of facil-
ities such as the Kennedy Center, theaters, arenas, museums, libraries,
and broadcast stations; and, third, spending by the government in con-
nection with its ownership of such facilities, when the government,
rather than operating the facilities itself, rents them to others.
The first amendment prohibits the government from "abridging"
free expression by inhibiting or discouraging it, as well as by prior re-
straint or subsequent punishment of speech.15 Professor Melville Nim-
mer has even suggested that the government may abridge speech simply
by eliminating a "basic incentive" for it.'"
By any of these standards, the government undoubtedly "abridges"
expression when it refuses to rent a theater to one person on account of
the content of the show that person wishes to stage, even though the
government is willing to rent the theater for other shows. 7 Whether
that refusal is unconstitutional poses a further problem; but in such a
case, the threshold question of "abridgment" must be answered against
the government. The threshold question of "abridgment" also seems
easily answered against the government in cases in which government-
supported libraries remove books, 8 government-supported museums re-
move artworks,' 9 and government-supported theaters or television sta-
tions cancel scheduled movie exhibitions. 20
15. M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 4.07, at 4-33.
16. Id.
17. See Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 546; Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745
F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1045 (1985).
18. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (limiting discretion of school board to
remove books from a high school library).
19. Cf. Piarowski v. Illinois Community College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.) (holding
that an art exhibit may be excluded from a private area of a college), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007
(1985).
20. Brown v. Board of Regents, 640 F. Supp. 674 (D. Neb. 1986); cf. Muir v. Alabama Educ.
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Government "abridgment" of expression is less recognizable in
cases in which limited resources require the government to select recipi-
ents from among many applicants. No doubt, some would say that an
abridgment is not easily recognized in these cases because none exists.
And in Arkansas Writers' Project Justice Scalia made just such an ar-
gument. He contended that the selective sales tax exemption at issue in
that case was a form of "subsidy," and that the denial of a subsidy does
not "necessarily" abridge expression, because the denial of a subsidy
"does not, as a general rule, have any significant coercive effect."'"
Characterizing a tax exemption as a subsidy is a bit of verbal al-
chemy that provides valuable insights, but it does not lead to the con-
clusions that Justice Scalia advocates. Allowing the use of public
forums for expressive purposes also is recognized as a form of "sub-
sidy. ' 22 Yet the first amendment rights of those who wish to use public
forums for expression do not depend on their ability to prove that they
would be significantly coerced if the government denied them permis-
sion to do so.23 Justice Scalia's contention that there is no difference
between a tax exemption and a government subsidy is accurate. But the
coin has another side: there also is no difference between the denial of a
subsidy and a tax. The burden of not receiving a subsidy is exactly
equal to the burden of having to pay a tax.
In concluding that the Arkansas sales tax was not coercive, Justice
Scalia obviously was influenced by what he considered to be its small
size. He found it "implausible that the 4% sales tax. . . was meant to
inhibit, or had the effect of inhibiting, this appellant's publication."2 '
On this point, however, Justice Scalia assumed facts not in evidence, or
at least not revealed in his opinion. Four percent of gross receipts,
which is the base on which Arkansas' tax is computed,2" may well equal
or exceed the total profits of many publications. And the ability of a
company to raise its prices sufficiently to collect the sales tax from cus-
tomers, without thereby losing a greater amount in sales because of the
price hike, is more difficult to determine than Justice Scalia admits.26
Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that individual viewers may not compel
broadcast of programs on public stations because the stations are not public forums).
21. Arkansas Writers' Project, 107 S. Ct. at 1731 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22. M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 234, 236 (1983).
23. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939); cf. Amalgamated Food Employees
Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 318-20, 324-25 (1968).
24. Arkansas Writers' Project, 107 S. Ct. at 1731 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-1903, 84-1903.1 (1980 & Supp. 1985), described in Arkansas Writ-
ers' Project, 107 S. Ct. at 1724.
26. The Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, for example, define "markets" using a
calculation which assumes that, for some products, a mere 5% increase in price will cause custom-
ers to purchase substitutes, if they are available. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (ANTITRUST DIv.), MERGER
GUinmNEs, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984), discussed in H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL
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In any event, the seemingly small size of the tax at issue in Arkan-
sas Writers' Project should not have led to the conclusion that it would
not inhibit those who had to pay it. Whatever its size, the burden of
paying the tax was exactly equal to the benefit of being exempt from it.
And Arkansas considered that benefit sufficiently valuable to enact the
exemption in the first place, and then to defend it in court. Indeed,
Arkansas' determination that some publications ought to be exempt
from its sales tax is tantamount to a confession that its tax would bur-
den certain, if not all, publications. It is troubling that what Arkansas
confessed, Justice Scalia found "implausible." But in this case at least,
Arkansas was, in effect, bound by its confession, and properly so.
More generally, the reciprocal nature of burdens and benefits dem-
onstrates that the extent of the burden imposed on those who do not
receive government subsidies is exactly equal to the extent of the bene-
fit conferred on those who do receive them. When governments grant
subsidies, one may assume that the government thinks those subsidies
are sufficiently valuable to be worth granting. Thus, those who do not
receive subsidies are deprived of something valuable; this deprivation
burdens them to the same degree that recipients of subsidies are bene-
fited. Whatever that degree might be, the denial of a subsidy that some-
one else has received is an "abridgment" for first amendment purposes.
The abridgment may not be direct like prior restraints and subsequent
punishments, but it is an indirect abridgment like other varieties of
government interference with the process of communicating. 7
III.
The government's granting and denying of subsidies for expression
on a selective basis is not automatically unconstitutional, simply be-
cause the denials are a form of "abridgment." The first amendment is
not absolute, and the government frequently abridges speech in a per-
fectly constitutional fashion. Whether the government grants and de-
nies subsidies for expression in a constitutional manner depends on the
criteria used by the government in making its selections. Naturally, the
criteria used by the government in granting subsidies for cultural and
artistic expression often involve content-related factors, which is why
some people who favor government subsidies for the arts would prefer
to keep the first amendment out of the selection process entirely, if
they could.
The perceived difficulty with content-based decisions is that state-
ments occasionally can be found in Supreme Court opinions, some of
ANTITRUST LAW 74-77 (1985) and law review commentary cited therein.
27. See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 3, §§ 4.02, 4.07, 4.09.
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which are quite recent, which seem to declare content-based decisions
irretrievably unconstitutional. Justice Marshall quoted two such state-
ments in his opinion for the Court in Arkansas Writers' Project:
"[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content";2 and "[r]egulations which permit the Govern-
ment to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot
be tolerated under the First Amendment. 29
Clearly, these statements do not mean exactly what they say, any
more than the first amendment itself does. If these statements were to
be taken at face value, the Supreme Court would have, by now, de-
clared unconstitutional all laws concerning defamation, privacy, fraud,
national security, and countless other subjects, because such laws do
discriminate against and restrict speech specifically on the basis of its
content. In fact, the Supreme Court itself has commented on the quali-
fied meaning that must be given to the claim that the first amendment
prohibits the government from restricting expression because of its con-
tent. As the Court indicated in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc.,30 "broad statements of principle, no matter how correct in the con-
text in which they are made, are sometimes qualified by contrary deci-
sions before the absolute limit of the stated principle is reached. '3 1
The broadly phrased first amendment principle that restrictions on
speech must be "content neutral" is actually much narrower than it
seems. "Content neutrality" is an umbrella term that covers three dif-
ferent varieties of neutrality: viewpoint neutrality, quality neutrality,
and subject matter neutrality. The first amendment does not require
the government to be neutral to the same degree in all three of these
areas.2 This insight helps to establish criteria for subsidizing the arts,
because in actual practice, governments have based their decisions on
the viewpoint, artistic quality, and subject matter of the works to be
subsidized. Thus, in order to adopt constitutional standards for subsi-
dizing art and culture, it is necessary to understand the degree of neu-
trality required by the first amendment in each of these three areas.
28. 107 S. Ct. at 1727 (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
29. Id. (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)).
30. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
31. Id. at 65.
32. See M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.07 (discussing viewpoint and subject matter
neutrality).
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A.
The first amendment virtually always requires viewpoint neutral-
ity." Thus, if the Corporation for Public Broadcasting were to award
grants for the production of documentaries about Central America, it
could not constitutionally adopt as a criterion for awarding such grants
the requirement that funded documentaries support, rather than criti-
cize, President Reagan's opposition to the Nicaraguan Sandinistas.
Even less political and more benevolent criteria would be unconsti-
tutional, if they were viewpoint based. In 1984, for example, Rigoletto
was staged at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York City. The
opera performed, however, was not Guiseppe Verdi's nineteenth-cen-
tury version set in sixteenth-century Italy. It was, instead, a contempo-
rary update set in twentieth-century America, which in the eyes of
many, promoted offensive and stereotypical images of Italian-Ameri-
cans. The National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) had given the Met
an 850,000 dollar grant that year. Congressman Mario Biaggi of the
Bronx protested the use of NEA funds to promote disparaging ethnic
images. He also proposed an amendment to the National Foundation on
the Arts and Humanities Act 4 that would have prohibited the NEA
from funding ethnically or racially offensive productions. 5 No such bill
was enacted. But had it been, such a bill would have been unconstitu-
tional, even though well intentioned, because it would not have been
viewpoint neutral.3 6
Justice Scalia seems to acknowledge the unconstitutionality of
viewpoint-based criteria-though he does so with apparent reluctance,
for he writes that "[p]erhaps a ... stringent, prophylactic rule is ap-
propriate ... when the subsidy pertains to the expression of a particu-
lar viewpoint on a matter of public concern. '3 7 Why "perhaps"? The
first amendment permits no other result in these or any similar
examples.
33. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,
328, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); see also M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.07, at
2-103 n.30.
34. 20 U.S.C. §§ 951-968 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
35. Note, The National Endowment for the Arts: A Search for an Equitable Grant Making
Process, 74 GEo. L.J. 1521, 1522 (1986).
36. Accord Note, supra note 35, at 1544, 1551; cf. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985), afl'd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986) (pornography ordinance held unconstitu-
tional on grounds it was not viewpoint neutral, because it prohibited speech that treated women in
disapproved ways, even though speech treating women in approved ways was not prohibited no
matter how sexually explicit it might be).
37. Arkansas Writers' Project, 107 S. Ct. at 1731 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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B.
Although the first amendment requires viewpoint neutrality, it
does not always require neutrality as to the artistic quality of works
that are to receive government subsidies. The ability to make decisions
based upon artistic quality is crucial when the government's resources
are limited and are insufficient to provide subsidies to all who apply for
them. In such cases, the government must select those who are to be
given grants, and only a limited number of logical criteria exist on
which to base such selections. The government could award grants on a
first come, first served basis. It could divide the available resources
equally among all grant applicants. It could select recipients on the ba-
sis of the anticipated quality of the works they would create. Or the
government could select recipients on the basis of the subject matter of
the works that would be created.
The first amendment permits the government to use quality as a
basis for selecting subsidy recipients-rather than requiring subsidies
to be awarded on a first come, first served basis, or in equal shares to all
applicants-because decisions based upon quality best serve the gov-
ernment's objectives. When the government subsidizes the arts, it does
so for reasons other than the redistribution of wealth. Although such
subsidies may have a redistributive effect, the subsidization of art and
culture has different objectives. Among the objectives that Congress has
recognized are: the encouragement of American progress in the arts; the
creation of a climate that fosters imagination; the establishment of ma-
terial conditions that facilitate the release of creative talent; and the
education of Americans concerning the aesthetic dimensions of our lives
and the diversity of our cultural heritage.38
While subsidies awarded on a first come, first served basis, or in
equal shares to all applicants, would redistribute wealth, they would not
contribute to achieving these objectives. Artistic and cultural works
that are likely to contribute to the achievement of these objectives can-
not be created by just anyone who is given the resources to make the
attempt. Works of this sort require artistic talent as well as material
resources, and artistic talent simply is not possessed by everyone in
equal measure. Awarding subsidies on a first come, first served basis
would reward administrative efficiency rather than artistic talent. Thus,
"first come, first served" would not even be a rational basis for award-
ing artistic and cultural subsidies, let alone a basis required by the first
amendment.
Subsidies awarded in equal shares to all who applied for them
38. National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 951 (1982 & Supp.
1985).
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would not contribute to the achievement of the objectives of subsidiza-
tion either. The government subsidizes the arts because it recognizes
that talent alone is not sufficient for the creation of art and culture:
resources too are necessary. When the government's resources are lim-
ited, dividing funds equally among all who apply for subsidies is likely
to result in each applicant receiving too little money to aid the creative
process. Thus, this method too would not be a rational means to
achieve the government's objectives, let alone a method required by the
first amendment.
For the government to achieve its objectives, government subsidies
must be large enough to aid their recipients, and the recipients must
have talent. These requirements may be fulfilled if, but only if, the gov-
ernment selects a relatively limited number of recipients on the basis of
the anticipated quality of their work. So long as "quality" judgments
are based on artistic factors-rather than viewpoint considera-
tions-first amendment doctrine does not prohibit the government
from taking anticipated quality into account in making its subsidization
selections. The necessity of excluding viewpoint considerations from
quality judgments, however, does raise an additional issue.
Artistic quality, of course, cannot be objectively measured; and
there is a risk that viewpoint considerations might influence-or even
be disguised as-quality judgments. Although the first amendment per-
mits subsidies to be awarded on the basis of artistic quality, the possi-
bility of impermissible viewpoint discrimination makes the identity of
those government officials who make quality judgments a first amend-
ment issue. In this regard, the first amendment requires the following:
First, an organizational separation between government officials whose
jobs are political in nature, on the one hand, and government officials
whose expertise is in art and culture and whose jobs are nonpolitical, on
the other; and second, the placement of responsibility for selecting sub-
sidy recipients solely in the hands of the nonpolitical art and cultural
experts, even though the decision to provide subsidies, and decisions as
to their nature and aggregate amount, must be made by politically ac-
countable government officials.39 This structural approach to fulfilling
the dictates of the first amendment appears to have been the reason for
the creation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which acts as a
39. See Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); cf. M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 4.09(D), at 4-87; M. YUDOF, supra note
22, at 243; Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications for Public Broad-
casting, 52 TEx. L. REv. 1123, 1160-64 (1974); Karat, supra note 14, at 257-59; Shiffrin, Govern-
ment Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 644-47 (1980); Note, Artistic Freedom and Government
Subsidy: Performing Arts Institutions in the United States and West Germany, 6 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 803, 824 (1983).
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nonpolitical expert in the selection of recipients of federal funds that
have been appropriated and approved by political bodies, namely, Con-
gress and the President.4 °
Although the first amendment apparently requires this sort of or-
ganizational structure, one federal court has ruled otherwise. In Advo-
cates for the Arts v. Thomson41 the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit upheld a decision by the Governor of New Hampshire
refusing to approve a 750 dollar grant that had been awarded to the
literary magazine Granite by the New Hampshire Commission on the
Arts. The Governor's decision was triggered by Granite's earlier publi-
cation of a poem entitled Castrating the Cat, which the Governor char-
acterized as "an item of filth" and an "obscenit[y]" (though not in the
constitutional sense). The First Circuit, speaking through Judge Levin
H. Campbell, found no "constitutional issue" in the Governor's reversal
of the decision of the Arts Commission, even though the court acknowl-
edged that "[t]here may, of course, be good reason to leave the decision
to an agency whose members are familiar with the arts and relatively
removed from political pressures." '42 Instead, the First Circuit ruled
that "[i]t is ultimately the prerogative of elected officials to decide
when and how to spend the tax dollar, and those administering grant
programs cannot ignore the importance of continued legislative and ex-
ecutive confidence in their judgment. '43 The Supreme Court denied
Granite's petition for certiorari." Judge Campbell's opinion, however,
has not fared as well in the "higher court" of academic opinion, which
has justifiably criticized the court's holding. 5 Nor was the opinion fol-
lowed in a subsequent Court of Appeals decision addressing the very
same point.46
In a thorough and thoughtful opinion by Judge Stephen Reinhardt
in Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank,7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed,
When decisions about what forms of expression will be permitted or which individ-
uals will be allowed to express themselves ... are made by a political body ....
those decisions must be scrutinized most carefully. . . . To the extent the decision-
maker is removed from the heat of the political process, or is free to make an inde-
40. Canby, supra note 39, at 1150-52.
41. 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
42. Id. at 797 n.7.
43. Id.
44. Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
45. Shiffrin, supra note 39, at 646; Note, supra note 39, at 822-24 (1983); cf. Note, supra note
35, at 1541-43, 1548. But see Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establish-
ment Clause, 67 CAns. L. Rzv. 1104, 1111 n.28 (1979).
46. See Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984); see also infra
notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
47. 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984).
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pendent judgment, the constitutional problem is less acute. 8
The court illustrated this principle by noting that a professional mu-
seum director's decision regarding exhibit selections would be less sus-
pect under the first amendment than a decision by a local, elected
official to veto a proposed museum exhibit.4 9 Similarly, a professional
concert promoter's decision not to book a particular performance "will
have a better chance of surviving first amendment scrutiny than a simi-
lar decision made by a mayor or other elected officials."50 On these
points, the Ninth Circuit is most certainly correct.
Although the first amendment does not always require neutrality as
to artistic quality in the subsidy-selection process, its tolerance for
quality as a decisionmaking criterion is based on the assumption that
the quality of a work is somehow relevant to the selection decision-as
would be the case, for the reasons just argued, if the government's re-
sources were limited. Because this Essay broadly defines "subsidy,"5'
however, there will be cases in which the government's resources are not
in fact limited. For example, if the government were to own a theater
that it rented to others on a show-to-show basis, the theater would not
be a limited resource whenever it was not being rented. If someone
wanted to rent the theater for a period during which it otherwise would
not be used, the artistic quality of the proposed show should be entirely
irrelevant to the government-as it would be under the first amend-
ment. In this circumstance, a supposedly quality-based decision not to
rent the theater could only be a subterfuge for a decision based on the
viewpoint or subject matter of the proposed show. A viewpoint-based
decision would be clearly unconstitutional.5" A subject matter-based de-
cision would require further analysis.
C.
The third variety of "content neutrality" is subject matter neutral-
ity. The first amendment does not absolutely require this form of neu-
trality. The Supreme Court virtually stated as much in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation" and Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,54 in which it
upheld the constitutionality of laws that prohibit the dissemination of
adult entertainment at certain times and in certain places. Moreover, in
many other cases the Court has upheld the constitutionality of laws
48. Id. at 575.
49. Id. at 575-76.
50. Id.
51. See supra text preceding note 15.
52. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
53. 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
54. 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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that are not subject matter neutral, without so much as a passing refer-
ence to the content-neutrality requirement. For example, in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan5 5 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a law
that makes newspapers liable for printing defamatory political state-
ments about public officials, if those statements are made with actual
malice. In Time, Inc. v. Hill56 the Justices held constitutional a law that
makes magazines liable for publishing interesting but inaccurate arti-
cles that invade the privacy of their subjects, if such articles are pub-
lished with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, their inaccuracy.
Recently in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises7 the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a law making journalists liable for
copying the written but as yet unpublished recollections of former pub-
lic officials.
Under the first amendment, constitutionality does not depend on
subject matter neutrality. If, however, a law is subject matter neutral,
its purpose necessarily will be to protect what Professor Nimmer refers
to as "non-speech" governmental interests.58 Laws of this sort are pre-
sumptively constitutional, and will be upheld so long as they satisfy cer-
tain conditions outlined by the Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Brien.59
On the other hand, if a law is not subject matter neutral, its pur-
pose necessarily will be to protect what Professor Nimmer refers to as
"anti-speech" governmental interests. 0 Laws of this sort are presump-
tively unconstitutional, but not conclusively so. Even laws that are not
subject matter neutral are constitutional if they survive what Professor
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
56. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
57. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
58. M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.07 at 2-99 to 2-100. A "non-speech" governmental interest
is one that is injured, not by the content of the speech, but by the mere act of communicating
regardless of the content of the communication. Parade ordinances that regulate the time and
place parades may be staged, in order to prevent interference with traffic, are examples of restric-
tions that protect a "non-speech" interest. See M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.04. Laws designed to
protect "non-speech" interests are presumptively constitutional, because the protection of such
interests does not require the restriction of speech content, and laws of this sort do not seek to
restrict particular ideas or information. Id. § 2.06.
59. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.06; L. TamE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-3, 12-5, 12-6, 12-20 (1978).
60. M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.07, at 2-100 to 2-103; see also L. Tam, supra note 59,
§§ 12-2, 12-3. An "anti-speech" governmental interest is one that is injured by the content of
speech. Libel laws, for example, further the governmental interest in the protection of reputa-
tion-an interest that is injured by the false and defamatory content of libelous speech. See M.
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.04. Laws designed to protect "anti-speech" interests are presumptively
unconstitutional, because in order to protect such interests laws of this sort necessarily restrict the
content of speech, in direct violation of the first amendment. Id. § 2.05[B].
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Nimmer describes as "definitional balancing,"61 but what courts and
most other commentators describe as "strict scrutiny," which requires
that the law in question serve a "compelling state interest."62 A law
authorizing the Kennedy Center to present music, opera, drama, dance
and poetry, but not learned lectures or political speeches, would be sub-
ject matter discriminatory. A decision by the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting to fund productions on certain subjects, but not others,
would also be subject matter discriminatory, as would a municipal thea-
ter policy limiting its productions to operas or Shakespeare, to the ex-
clusion of rock musicals and contemporary drama. Since government
subsidy decisions like these are not subject matter neutral, they are
subject to strict scrutiny.
The application of strict scrutiny does not mean, however, that
subject matter-based decisions will always-or even frequently-be un-
constitutional. Indeed, Professor Robert Kamenshine has said that it
would be "absurd" to "bar the government from supporting contempo-
rary art over traditional art, ballet over modern dance, and family-ori-
ented entertainment over adult entertainment."63 For Professor
Kamenshine, "[t]he proposition that government is constitutionally
prohibited from creating a museum of modern art or a children's thea-
tre, or from providing aid to similar private endeavors is difficult to
take seriously."64 While this may be too strong a way to put it, Profes-
sor Kamenshine's conclusion is correct. Government decisions to subsi-
dize some forms of art and culture, but not others, are usually
constitutional because such decisions usually serve compelling govern-
mental interests.
IV.
Some people-Justices Scalia and Rehnquist apparently among
them-may be reluctant to subject benevolent government policies to
strict scrutiny, because they fear that "strict scrutiny" is a standard
that cannot be met.6 5 This, however, is not the case. Insofar as govern-
ment subsidies for the arts are concerned, subject matter-based selec-
tions can and do serve compelling governmental interests and thus may
satisfy strict scrutiny. 8 The compelling interests in question are those
61. M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 2.03.
62. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 362 (1976); L. TRIBE, supra note 59, § 12-8.
63. Kamenshine, supra note 45, at 1111.
64. Id.
65. Cf. Karst, supra note 14, at 248-52, 259-63.
66. See, e.g., M. NIMMER, supra note 3, § 4.09[D], at 4-81 to 4-88; Canby, supra note 39, at
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that induce governments to provide subsidies for art and culture in the
first place-for example, those identified by Congress in the National
Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act."
The selection of certain subjects for subsidies does result, of course,
in the rejection of others, and the speech of those whose subjects are
rejected is abridged to a measurable degree.68 On the other hand, when-
ever government resources are limited, selectivity on some basis is re-
quired in order for the government to achieve its objectives at all." If
proper criteria are used, selections based on subject matter can produce
a net gain in the amount of artistic and cultural expression actually
produced. Thus, if the government elects to use its limited resources to
subsidize forms of expression that are not readily available without sub-
sidies (such as Shakespeare, opera, ballet, fine art, and documentaries),
rather than forms of expression that are readily available even without
subsidies (such as contemporary drama, rock concerts and dance shows,
popular graphic arts, and situation comedies), the amount of speech
gained through selective subsidization exceeds the amount lost. On bal-
ance, the purpose of the first amendment-the encouragement of ex-
pression-is achieved, and this type of government subsidy decision
withstands strict scrutiny.70 The same cannot be said, however, for the
government subsidy decisions made in Arkansas Writers' Project or
Southeastern Promotions.
V.
The government decision at issue in Arkansas Writers' Project,
which exempted from sales tax only those journals devoted to religious,
professional, trade, and sports subjects, appears to have been viewpoint
neutral. The government decision at issue in Southeastern Promotions,
which denied rental of a city-owned theater to the producers of Hair,
may have been viewpoint neutral too, although Professor Karst prop-
erly questions whether the decision actually was viewpoint neutral.71 In
neither case was the government's decision based on quality. Instead, in
both cases the decisions were based on subject matter, but they could
not survive strict scrutiny.
In Arkansas Writers' Project the state did not argue that religious,
professional, trade, and sports journals had been given subsidies, be-
1133-34; Karst, supra note 14, at 259; Shiffrin, supra note 39, at 640-44.
67. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
69. See supra text preceding and following note 38.
70. Cf. Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 575 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
71. Karst, supra note 14, at 255.
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cause unless subsidized, journals on these subjects were less likely to be
published than journals on other subjects. Such an argument would
have lacked factual support, and to its credit, Arkansas tried a differ-
ent, although equally implausible, argument. Arkansas contended that
the sales tax exemption for religious, professional, trade, and sports
journals was intended to encourage "fledgling" publishers. If so, how-
ever, the exemption was both overinclusive, because it also exempted
well-established religious, professional, trade, and sports journals, and
underinclusive, because it failed to exempt fledgling publishers whose
journals covered other subjects. As a result, the exemption did "not
serve its alleged purpose in any significant way, even if that purpose
is assumed to be compelling.
In Southeastern Promotions the City of Chattanooga did not argue
that it had excluded Hair from its theater because other producers
wanted to rent the theater at the same time in order to stage other
shows that were less likely than Hair to be produced without the use of
the city-owned theater. Instead, the city acknowledged that it excluded
Hair simply because the show was not "in the best interest of the com-
munity." The Supreme Court ruled against the city on the grounds that
the city's refusal to rent to Hair's producers was a prior restraint that
lacked the necessary procedural safeguards.
The result in Southeastern Promotions would not have been differ-
ent, however, even if the city had provided the procedural safeguards
required by the first amendment in prior restraint cases. The issue then
would have been whether the city's grounds for refusing to rent the the-
ater were constitutional. A "best interest of the community" standard is
not constitutional. It is vague,7 3 and "serving the community's 'best in-
terest'" is hardly a "compelling" governmental interest.74 Moreover,
the city would have been unable to show that excluding Hair from its
theater was the least restrictive means of protecting that interest.7 '5
If the Chattanooga theater had been an opera house, or had been
devoting its entire season to Shakespeare-as Justice Rehnquist rhetor-
ically suggested-the case would have focused on a different issue. The
question then would have been whether a production of Hair would
have conflicted with the city's use of the theater for opera or Shake-
speare. If no conflict existed-because, perhaps, the producers of Hair
wanted to rent the theater when it was not otherwise in use-then the
city's refusal to rent to Hair's producers would not have served a com-
72. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1729 (1987).
73. Cf. Cinevision Corp., 745 F.2d at 573.
74. Id.
75. M. NIMmR, supra note 3, § 2.05[B], at 2-39 to 2-41.
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pelling governmental interest, and thus would have been unconstitu-
tional. On the other hand, if there had been such a conflict, the city
could have made a very persuasive argument that opera and Shake-
speare were less likely than Hair to be produced in Chattanooga with-
out the use of the city-owned theater. In that case, the city's decision to
select opera or Shakespeare over Hair would have served the compel-
ling governmental interest of broadening the artistic and cultural hori-
zons of the city's residents. And thus, the decision would have been
constitutional.
